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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1977, bribery was considered legal in many countries
worldwide.! In fact, bribery payments were often tax deductible in many of
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1. See History of the FCPA: How a Tough U.S. Anti-Bribery Law Came to Pass, PBS (Feb.
13, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/02/history-of-the-fcpa.html (last visited
Oct. 20, 2011).
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these territories.2 However, the general atmosphere towards bribery began
to change after the United States (U.S.) explicitly proscribed the practice of
bribery by enacting the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in December
1977. The FCPA was established following a Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) investigation into illegal contributions made to
President Nixon's re-election campaign.4 The SEC's investigation
uncovered over $300 million of corrupt foreign payments made by over 400
U.S. companies, over 100 of which ranked in the Fortune 500.s The FCPA
was created in an attempt to terminate such bribery practices and "restore
public confidence in the integrity of the American business system by
making it unlawful for U.S. citizens and companies to make a corrupt
payment to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any person.'
The years following the FCPA's enactment saw a change in the
general attitude towards transnational bribery; bribery and corruption
became universally discouraged.7 Bribery and corruption by international
businesses inhibits free trade and economic development in many countries
by undermining competition in these international markets. During the
1990s, corruption was considered one of the principle impediments to
economic growth and democratic accountability. 9 The World Bank, in a
report, noted that "corruption has a negative relationship with per capita
GDP, . . . lowers the quality of public infrastructure, . . . lowers public
satisfaction with health care, . . . undermines the official economy, and
reduces the effectiveness of development aid and increases inequality and
2. See generally John Hatchard, Recent Developments in Combating the Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials: A Cause For Optimism?, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2007).
3. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (2006); Hatchard, supra note 2, at 4-5.
4. DON ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1.1 (Prac.
L. Inst. 1998).
5. Hatchard, supra note 2, at 4; Todd Swanson, Greasing the Wheels: British Deficiencies in
Relation to American Clarity in International Anti-Corruption Law, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 397,
402 (2007).
6. Hatchard, supra note 2, at 4.
7. Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion, 33
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 627, 628-29 (2000) (noting that people no longer tolerated corruption and that
various groups have employed extraterritorial anti-bribery laws to combat corruption); Leslie Benton et
al., Anti-Corruption, 42 INT'L LAW 709, 717 (2008) (noting that China executed the head of the State
Food and Drug Administration for approving untested medicine in exchange for money).
8. Swanson, supra note 5, at 399.
9. Daniel P. Ashe, Comment, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United States: The
Recent Extraterritorial Applications of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
2897, 2909-10 n.86 (2005).
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poverty."'o Global nations quickly realized that corruption was not
confined to only developing countries, but rather affected all participants of
international markets." International rules regulating transnational bribery
are necessary to foster free and fair trading conditions for participants in
today's international markets, but the extent to which these trading
conditions are regulated remains heavily debated.12
For twenty years after the FCPA's enactment in 1977, the United
States was the only country with a formal law that facilitated prosecution of
domestic companies that paid bribes abroad to foreign government
officials.' 3 Eventually, other countries followed suit and ostracized foreign
bribery by uniting and establishing the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).14  On November 21, 1997, in an
effort to create concrete rules to govern bribery in international business
transactions, the OECD adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD
Convention).' 5 Thirty-seven nations, including all of Western Europe,
signed and ratified the OECD convention.' 6 The OECD Convention:
[R]equires that each signatory prohibit the bribing of foreign
officials, set criminal and civil penalties for violations, and either
extradite or prosecute its nationals who are accused of bribery by
another signatory . . . [i]t also contains provisions for continued
monitoring of the implementation of the convention by
signatories. 17
Although the United Kingdom (U.K.) signed the OECD's anti-
corruption convention, its inadequate anti-bribery laws were the subject of
10. WORLD BANK, REP. No. 29620, MAINSTREAMING ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIVITIES IN
WORLD BANK ASSISTANCE: A REVIEW OF PROGRESS SINCE 1997, 1 (2004), available at
http://Inweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsfl24cc3bblf94aellc85256808006a0046/04835lb876971
b9285256eed006aae69/$FILE/anti corruption.pdf (last visited Oct. 20,2011) [hereinafter OECD REP.].
11. Ashe, supra note 9, at 2911.
12. See generally Abiola Makinwa, The Rules Regulating Transnational Bribery: Achieving a
Common Standard, 2007 INT'L Bus. L.J. 17.
13. See Timothy W. Schmidt, Note, Sweetening the Deal: Strengthening Transnational
Bribery Laws Through Standard International Corporate Auditing Guidelines, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1120,
1125-28(2009).
14. Id. at 1126.
15. Swanson, supra note 5, at 406.
16. See Schmidt, supra note 13, at 1126.
17. Id. at 1127.
2011] Hunter 91
92 ILSA Journal ofInternational & Comparative Law
constant criticism by the OECD.18  As a result, the OECD published a
report in October 2008 extensively criticizing the United Kingdom's
persistent failure to address its deficient anti-corruption and anti-bribery
laws.19 In response to the OECD's report, the United Kingdom enacted the
U.K. Bribery Act (Bribery Act) in April 2010.20 The Act came into force
on July 1, 2011 and focuses on bribery in both the public and private
sectors. 2 ' The Bribery Act creates new offenses that reach far beyond the
scope of the United States' FCPA.22
This Note has four principal purposes. The first is to establish the
background of the FCPA and the Bribery Act by discussing the events that
influenced each law's creation. Second, it will examine both the FCPA and
the Bribery Act in depth and illustrate their differences. Third, it analyzes
the Bribery Act's global impact on international business transactions and
in conjunction with the FCPA. Finally, the Note will conclude with an
analysis of the likely outcome of the Bribery Act in the near future.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FCPA AND THE U.K. BRIBERY ACT
The FCPA is comprised of accounting provisions, which impose both
accounting and recordkeeping requirements upon publicly held U.S.
companies, as well as anti-bribery provisions that prohibit the bribing of
foreign government officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining
business. 23 This Note will only discuss the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions
since the Bribery Act does not address corporate accounting. The United
Kingdom's Company Act of 2006 imposes requirements similar to those of
the FCPA with respect to books and records. 24 The FCPA's anti-bribery
provisions impose criminal and civil penalties; criminal regulation falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Department of Justice
18. Swanson, supra note 5, at 401; Joseph Warin et al., The British Are Coming!: Britain
Changes Its Laws on Foreign Bribery and Joins the International Fight Against Corruption, 46 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 1 (2011).
19. ORG. FOR EcoN. COOP. AND DEV., UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 2BIs, 5-6 (2008) (criticizing
the United Kingdom); Warin et al., supra note 18, at 4.
20. See generally Bribery Act, 2010, c.23 (U.K.).
21. See generally Bribery Act, 2010, c.23 (U.K.); Celia Joseph, The United Kingdom's
Bribery Act 2010: Implications for Companies on a Global Basis, (Fisher & Phillips, LLP Atlanta, Ga.)
Apr. 11, 2011, http://www.crossborderemployer.com/post/2011/04/1 1The-United-Kingdoms-Bribery-
Act-2010-Implications-for-Companies-on-a-Global-Basis.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2011).
22. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2; Bribery Act, 2010, c.23 (U.K.).
23. ZARIN, supra note 4, at 2-1; Warin et al., supra note 18, at 7.
24. Warin et al., supra note 18, at 8.
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25(DOJ) and civil regulation falls within the SEC's exclusive authority.
Five elements must be met to constitute a violation of the FCPA:
1) The briber must be any U.S. citizen, business entity or
employee of a U.S. business entity or any company listed
on a U.S. stock exchange;
2) The bribe must be made with corrupt intent;
3) Payment or offer of payment must be anything of
value;
4) The recipient must be a foreign government official;
and
5) The bribe must have been offered or paid to obtain or
retain business.26
Distinguishably, the Bribery Act creates four separate offenses:
1) Bribing;
2) Being bribed;
3) Bribing a foreign public official; and
4) Failing as a commercial organization to prevent
bribery.27
The United Kingdom's Serious Fraud Office (SFO) is responsible for
investigating and prosecuting the most serious cases of fraud and corruption
in the United Kingdom and thus appropriately is responsible for enforcing
the Bribery Act's provisions.2 8
A. Jurisdiction: Who Falls within the FCPA & Bribery Act's Scope?
The FCPA defines bribery as a corrupt payment or offer of payment of
money or anything of value made to a foreign official in his or her capacity
as such for the purposes of influencing any act or decision of that foreign
official. 29 The FCPA establishes criminal and civil liability for such corrupt
25. R. Christopher Cook & Stephanie L. Connor, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Enforcement Trends in 2010 and Beyond, JONES DAY, at 2, available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/
Publication/f0950ee5-18bb-496f-acfe-662b219al08e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ada2352f-
OObO-4240-aeef-250a23629ba8/FCPA%2OEnforcement%20Trends.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2011).
26. U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS 2
(2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf (last visited
Aug. 5, 2011) [hereinafter DOJ GUIDE].
27. See generally Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § § 1-2, 6-7 (U.K.).
28. SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, APPROACH OF THE SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE To DEALING WITH
OVERSEAS CORRUPTION 1 (2009), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/128701/
approach%20ofo2Othe%20serious%20fraud%20office%20v6.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
29. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2(2006).
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payments made to foreign officials by issuers, domestic concerns, or any
officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or domestic concern, or
any stockholder acting on behalf of such issuer or domestic concern. 30 An
issuer is a corporation that has registered its securities in the United States
or who is required to file periodic reports with the SEC. 3 1 The FCPA
defines domestic concern very broadly to include U.S. citizens, nationals,
and residents, as well as, any corporation, partnership, association, joint-
stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole
proprietorship that is either incorporated under the laws of a state or
commonwealth of the United States, or whose principal place of business is
in the United States. 32  Therefore, the foreign activity of private U.S.
companies also falls within the FCPA's scope. In addition, the FCPA
applies to foreign national officers and directors of a U.S. company or
foreign national stockholders acting on behalf of a U.S. company.34 Issuers
and domestic concerns may be held liable for acts occurring within the
United States if they perform an act in furtherance of a corrupt payment to a
foreign official using the U.S. mail, or means and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce.35 Such means or instrumentalities include wire
transfers, facsimile transmissions, telephone calls, and interstate or
international travel.36 Foreign companies and officers, directors,
employees, agents, and stockholders acting on behalf of such foreign
companies, as well as foreign natural persons, can be held liable under the
FCPA for acts in furtherance of foreign corrupt practices while within the
United States.37 Issuers and domestic concerns may also be held liable for
any act in furtherance of a corrupt payment authorized by employees or
agents operating entirely outside the United States without any involvement
from personnel located within the United States. 38  Similarly, U.S.
corporations may be held liable for the acts of their foreign subsidiaries if
they authorized, directed, or controlled the activity in question.39 Domestic
concerns may be liable if they were employed by or acting on behalf of the
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2; Zarin, supra note 4, at 4-1; Warin et al., supra note 18, at 9.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (2006); DOJ GUIDE, supra note 26.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1); Christopher L. Hall, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A
Competitive Disadvantage, But For How Long?, 2 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 289, 294 (1994); ZARIN,
supra note 4, at 4-3 to 4-4.
33. See generally DOJ GUIDE, supra note 26.
34. ZARIN, supra note 4, at 4-5.
35. See generally DOJ GUIDE, supra note 26.
36. Id.
37. Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 345, 360 (2000).
38. See generally DOJ GUIDE, supra note 26.
39. Id.
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foreign-incorporated subsidiary.40 Furthermore, the FCPA imposes liability
on foreign companies or persons if they cause, directly or through agents,
an act in furtherance of the corrupt payment to take place within the United
States.4 1 In this scenario, the DOJ has indicated that there is no requirement
that this particular act make use of the U.S. mails or other means or
42instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
The Bribery Act has a wider extra-territorial reach than the FCPA.43
The Bribery Act creates four anti-bribery offenses:
1) Bribing;
2) Being bribed;
3) Bribing a foreign public official; and
4) Failing as a commercial organization to prevent
bribery."
The first two offenses, bribing and being bribed, relate to commercial
(domestic) as well as foreign bribery.45 The Bribery Act refers to bribing as
offering, promising, or giving a financial or other advantage to induce a
person to improperly perform a relevant duty or function, to reward a
person for such improper activity, or to know or believe that the acceptance
of the advantage would itself be an improper performance of a duty or
function.46 The second offense, being bribed, prohibits requesting, agreeing
to receive, or accepting a financial or other advantage while intending that a
relevant function or activity be performed improperly.47 The last two
offenses, bribing a foreign public official and failing as a commercial
organization to prevent bribery, are likely to form the basis of the majority
of foreign corruption investigations pursued by U.K. enforcement
authorities. 8 The offense of bribing a foreign public official criminalizes
the act of bribing such an official with the intention of influencing that
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Weil Alert: U.K. Bribery Act, (Weil, Gothshal & Manges, London, U.K.), May 24, 2010,
at 2, available at http://www.weil.com/files/Publication/cle3O6el-bf27-466e-8063-756ea952cbe9/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fbb5317d-d916-4eOf-a290-
7c91588b66al/LOUK Bribery Act 2010 May_2010.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) [hereinafter
Weil Alert: UK. Bribery Act].
44. Bribery Act, 2010, §§ 1-2, 6-7.
45. Id.
46. Bribery Act § 1; Margaret Ryznar & Samer Korkor, Anti-Bribery Legislation in the United
States and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis ofScope and Sentencing, 76 Mo. L. REv. 415,
441 (2010).
47. Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 46, at 441.
48. Warin et al., supra note 18, at 8.
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foreign official in his or her capacity as such.49 This offense is governed by
a "close connection" test, which gives the United Kingdom jurisdiction if
the person or entity committing the act of bribery has a close connection
with the United Kingdom, even if the challenged act or omission took place
outside of the United Kingdom.50 British citizens, other types of British
passport holders, U.K. residents, entities incorporated under any part of
U.K. law, and Scottish partnerships are all treated as having a "close
connection with the United Kingdom" for purposes of the Bribery Act.5'
The Bribery Act's last offense of failing as a commercial organization to
prevent bribery is a strict liability corporate offense.52 An organization is
guilty of such offense if a person associated with the organization bribes
another person with the intention of obtaining or retaining business for the
organization or obtaining an advantage in conducting business for the
organization. The Bribery Act is not limited to U.K. companies alone, but
also applies to any company that conducts business, or part of its business,
in any part of the United Kingdom, even if no part of the bribery occurred
in the United Kingdom. 54 Under the Bribery Act, the offenses of offering a
bribe, accepting a bribe, and bribing a foreign public official have a similar
jurisdictional scope as the FCPA because jurisdiction is conferred when the
relevant act or omission takes place within the United Kingdom, or
anywhere in the world, when committed by a person closely connected to
the United Kingdom.5 5  The Bribery Act's last offense of failing as a
corporation to prevent bribery by persons associated with the corporation
has a broader reach than the FCPA, because it covers both U.K. companies,
as well as, companies that carry out business in any part of the United
Kingdom. 56
B. Bribery ofForeign Public Officials & Commercial Bribery
The FCPA prohibits corrupt payments made to foreign officials,
employees, or persons acting on behalf of such officials, foreign political
parties, or candidates for foreign political office. However, the FCPA
49. Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 46, at 441.
50. Warin et al., supra note 18, at 15.
51. Id.
52. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2; Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 46, at 441.
53. Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 46, at 441.
54. See generally Bribery Act; Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 46, at 441.
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(g), 78dd-2(i); see generally Bribery Act, 2010, c.23 (U.K.).
56. See generally Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 7 (U.K.).
57. ZARIN, supra note 4, at 4-11; Swanson, supra note 5, at 409.
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does not prohibit bribes paid to officers or employees of private, non-
governmental entities.58 The FCPA defines foreign official as:
[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a
public international organization, or any person acting in
an official capacity for or on behalf of any such
government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or
for or on behalf of any such public international
60organization.
Despite the FCPA's detailed definition of foreign official, the FCPA
fails to provide any guidance as to the scope of the terms "employee" and
"officer." 61 It is also unclear whether these terms should be determined
with reference to foreign local law.62 Nevertheless, U.S. enforcement
authorities broadly interpret foreign officials to include both traditional
government officials as well as officials of state-owned or state controlled
entities.63 The FCPA also prohibits payments that indirectly benefit persons
committing bribery to obtain or retain foreign business.6 Accordingly, any
act that directly or indirectly aids in the obtaining or retaining of foreign
business will fall within the FCPA's purview.
Unlike the FCPA, the Bribery Act prohibits both public and
commercial bribery.66 This sweeping jurisdictional reach subjects many
58. Eric Engle, I Get by with a Little Help from my Friends? Understanding the UK. Anti-
Bribery Statute, By Reference to the OECD Convention and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 44
INT'L LAW. 1173, 1186 (2010); Zarin, supra note 4, at 4-11; Swanson, supra note 5, at 409.
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(1)(B), 78dd-2(h)(2)(B) (Public International Organizations refer to
organizations that are designated by Executive Order or any other international organization that is
designated by the President by Executive Order and includes organizations such as the International
Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the Red Cross); Exec. Order No. 9698, 11 Fed. Reg. 1809 (Feb.
19, 1946); Exec. Order No. 9751, 11 Fed. Reg. 7713 (July 11, 1946); Exec. Order No. 12,643, 53 Fed.
Reg. 24,247 (June 23, 1988).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2).
61. ZARIN, supra note 4, at 4-12.
62. Id.
63. See United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that
the definition of "foreign officials" in the FCPA could extend to officers of state-owned utilities. The
judge also noted that the inclusion of such officials was a matter of statutory construction).
64. Makinwa, supra note 12, at 19 (referencing United States v. David Kay & Douglas
Murphy, S.D. Tex. 2001, where the Court determined that Congress meant to prohibit a range of
payments wider than only those that directly influence the obtaining or retaining of business. The Court
also added that Congress intended the FCPA to prohibit all illicit payments that are intended to influence
non-trivial official foreign action in an effort to obtain or retain business).
65. Makinwa, supra note 12, at 19.
66. See generally Bribery Act, 2010, c.23 (U.K.).
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organizations to the Bribery Act because, under the provisions of the
Bribery Act, a commercial organization includes both organizations
incorporated in the United Kingdom, as well as, any other organization that
conducts business in the United Kingdom. In contrast to the FCPA, the
Bribery Act does not require that a bribe be made with corrupt intent, but
rather makes the inducing of improper performance of a relevant function a
necessary requirement for prosecution. The Bribery Act defines a foreign
public official as an individual who holds a legislative, administrative, or
judicial position, whether appointed or elected, of a country or territory
outside the United Kingdom. 69 In addition, the Bribery Act characterizes a
foreign public official as an individual who exercises a public function for
or on behalf of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, for any
public agency or public enterprise of that country or territory, or an official
or agent of a public international organization.70  The Bribery Act's
definition of foreign public official closely mirrors the FCPA's definition of
the same.7 ' The definition of foreign official under the Bribery Act does
not include candidates for public office, but such individuals fall within the
scope of the Bribery Act's general offenses.72 The wide scope of the
Bribery Act's general anti-bribery offenses allows U.K. enforcement
authorities to pursue cases as commercial bribery when they cannot
otherwise be prosecuted based on a bribery of a government official
theory.
67. Id. § 7 (the Act defines a commercial organization as
a) a body which is incorporated under the law of any part of the United
Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere);
b) any other body corporate (wherever incorporated) which carries on a
business, or part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom;
c) a partnership which is formed under the law of any part of the United
Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere);
or
d) any other partnership (wherever formed) which carries on a business,
or part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom, and for
purposes of this section, a trade or profession is a business.);
Ivonne M. King et al., U.K. Bribery Act: Raising the Bar For Anti-Corruption Programs, 2011 PRAc.
L. INST. 353, 357 (2011).
68. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 1 (U.K.).
69. Id. § 6(5).
70. Id.; Bribery Act § 6(6) (defines public international organisation as an organisation whose
members are countries or territories, governments or countries or territories, other public international
organizations, or a mixture of any of the above).
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-l(f)(1)(A); Warin et al., supra note 18, at 18.
72. See generally Bribery Act, 2010, c.23 (U.K.).
73. Id.
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C. What Constitutes a Bribe Under the FCPA and the Bribery Act? -
"Anything of Value"
The FCPA prohibits the payments of gifts or "anything of value" to
influence a foreign official. 74 The FCPA does not define the term "anything
of value," but the term "has been broadly construed by Federal courts
interpreting criminal statutes to include both tangible and intangible
benefits which an official subjectively believes to be of value."7s However,
the FCPA gives no indication whether the term extends to payments given
to a third party for whose welfare the official is interested, but rather
focuses on whether there is any intent or expectation that the official will
personally benefit from the thing of value. On the other hand, the Bribery
Act considers a bribe to be any financial or other advantage.77
D. Exceptions: Facilitation or "Grease" Payments
The FCPA creates an exception to its anti-bribery provisions that
allows for any facilitating or expediting payments to be made to a foreign
official, political party, or party official in order to expedite or secure the
performance of a routine governmental action. 78 - These exclusive payments
are commonly referred to as "facilitating payments" or "grease
payments."79  Routine governmental action refers to general bureaucratic
tasks that foreign officials ordinarily perform.80  Notably, the FCPA's
definition of a facilitation payment expressly excludes any foreign official's
decision to award new business to, or continued business with, any
particular party.8' The 1977 House Report differentiates facilitation
payments from acts of bribery by distinguishing between payments that
''cause an official to exercise other than his free will in acting or deciding or
influencing an act or decision" and payments that "merely move a
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a).
75. See United States v. Schwartz, 785 F.2d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1986) (interpreting thing of
value under 18 U.S.C. § 1954 broadly to include tangible and intangible items); United States v. Zouras,
497 F.2d 1115, 1121 (7th Cir. 1974) (treating testimony of a witness as something of value). See
generally United States v. Crozier, 987 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1993) (considering loans and promises of
future employment as things of value); United States v. McDade, 827 F.Supp. 1153, 1174 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (characterizing a college scholarship and sports equipment as things of value).
76. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2; ZARIN, supra note 4, at 4-25 to -26.
77. Bribery Act § 1; Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 46, at 441.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b).
79. Monty Raphael & Ben Summers, At Last the UnitedKingdom Confronts Bribery: Will the
Draft Bribery Bill be Enough to Silence Its Critics?, 10 BUS. L. INT'L 242, 243 (2009).
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I(f)(3)(A), 78dd-2(h)(4)(A); Hall, supra note 32, at 300.
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(3)(B), 78dd-2(h)(4)(B); Hall, supra note 32, at 300; Raphael,
supra note 78, at 243.
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particular matter toward an eventual act or decision or which do not involve
any discretionary action."82 Gratuity paid to a customs official to expedite
the processing of a customs document is characterized as a facilitation
payment in the legislative history.83 It is important to note, as well, that the
Senate Report also reaffirmed that the exception is meant to apply only to
"grease payments."84
The Bribery Act, on the other hand, contains no exception for
facilitation payments.85  The only facilitation payments likely to be
acceptable are those expressly allowed by law. 6 Consequently, the Bribery
Act prohibits the types of payments currently permitted under the FCPA.
As a result, U.K. companies and individuals are potentially placed at a
commercial disadvantage compared to similarly situated companies in the
United States. The differences in these two laws could considerably
impact organizations' corporate compliance programs, as the two are
disjointed in this regard.89 However, the SFO has asserted that they do not
anticipate many prosecutions on facilitation payments. 90 It is important to
bear in mind that the SFO will have full discretion to pursue investigations
according to the Bribery Act's prohibition against facilitation payments.9'
Although the authorities indicate a low probability of enforcement towards
these types of payments, companies are still expected to ultimately adopt a
zero tolerance policy.9 2
82. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977); Andrew B. Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions:
Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L.
REv. 351, 365 (2010).
83. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977); Spalding, supra note 81, at 365.
84. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977); Spalding, supra note 81, at 365 (noting that the 1977
House Report demonstrates a degree of cultural sensitivity to differing cultural norms surrounding
conduct that in the United States is considered bribery); For a thorough discussion on the history behind
the facilitation payments exception, see Jon Jordan, The OECD's Call for an End to "Corrosive"
Facilitation Payments and the International Focus on the Facilitation Payments Exception Under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 881, 889-894 (2011).
85. See generally Bribery Act, 2010, c.23 (U.K.).
86. Id.
87. See generally MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE 19 (2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf (last visited Aug.
5, 2011) [hereinafter BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE]. (Noting that "[e]xemptions in this context create
artificial distinctions that are difficult to enforce, undermine corporate anti-bribery procedures, confuse
anti-bribery communication with employees and other associated persons, perpetuate an existing
'culture' of bribery and have the potential to be abused."); Warin et al., supra note 18, at 20.
88. Warin et al., supra note 18, at 20.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 20-21.
92. Id. at 21.
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E. Affirmative Defenses
The FCPA creates two affirmative defenses to its anti-bribery
provisions.93 The first affirmative defense asserts that the payment of a gift,
or promise of anything of value is lawful if the written laws and regulations
of the foreign official's country permit such payments.94 To fall within its
limits, the conduct must be explicitly permitted under the written laws and
regulations of the foreign country.95  The simple absence of a law
prohibiting the conduct is not sufficient. The second affirmative defense
asserts that the payment, gift, or promise of anything of value is lawful if it
was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging
expenses, and was directly related to the promotion, demonstration, or
explanation of products or services, or the execution or performance of a
contract with a foreign government or agency.9 7  However, the FCPA's
legislative history makes it clear that "any payments made with 'corrupt
intent' would not be considered bona fide expenses and would fall outside
the purview of permissible activity."98  Several useful guidelines that can
help minimize FCPA concerns for the payment of travel and lodge
expenses for government customers are as follows:
1) The expenditure should be for a bona fide and
legitimate business purpose;
2) The expenditure should be directly related to the
promotion, demonstration or explanation of a product or
service, or the execution or performance of a contract;
3) The U.S. company should follow a rule of
reasonableness in determining the level of service and
hospitality;
4) There should be no question that the foreign official's
government is unaware of the travel;
5) The payment of travel and lodging expenses should be
permissible under local law and government customers
regulations and guidelines;
6) The selection of the officials going on the business
trip should generally be by the government customer;
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c), 78dd-2(c).
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1); Hall, supra note 32, at 300.
95. ZAlUN, supra note 4, at 5-9.
96. H.R. REP. No. 100-418, at 922, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in
1988 US.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1955.
97. 15 USC. §§ 78dd-l(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2).
98. H.R. REP. No. 100-418, at 922 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in
1988 US.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1955; ZAluN, supra note 4, at 5-6.
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7) To the extent practical, the U.S. company should
avoid making direct payments to a foreign official:
a) Where practical, the company should directly
pay the government agency an agreed-upon per diem for
each attendee. The government agency would then be
directly responsible to pay each attendee's per diem living
expense;
b) Where practical, all travel expenses should be
paid directly to the service providers, upon receipt of
appropriate invoices;
c) Where direct payments are unavoidable, the U.S.
company should reimburse the foreign official only upon
receipt of appropriate invoices and confirmation that the
expense has in fact been paid by the official;
8) The itinerary and budget for the trip should be
reviewed and approved by a senior manager outside of the
sales department;
9) Expenses incurred by the customer for side trips or
stopovers for the pleasure of the customer should not be
paid or reimbursed by the U.S. company;
10) Expenses generally incurred for spouses and family
members should not be paid or reimbursed, except in
exception situations and subject to review by legal
counsel;
11) The books and records should accurately record all
expenditures."
The Bribery Act contains no similar defense to the FCPA's business
promotion expenditures defense.100 This has raised questions amongst
commentators as to whether the Bribery Act may result in prosecutions for
payments that would be considered lawful under the FCPA.101
Nevertheless, guidance from the United Kingdom's Ministry of Justice
(MOJ) suggests that reasonable and proportionate promotional expenditures
will not be prosecuted. 02  However, unlike the FCPA the Bribery Act
99. ZARIN, supra note 4, at 5-7 (noting that the affirmative defense is not limited to travel and
lodging expense; but rather, it applies to any reasonable and bona fide expenditure incurred by or on
behalf of a foreign official when the expenditure is directly related to the promotion, demonstration, or
explanation of products or the execution or performance of a contract).
100. See generally Bribery Act, 2010, c.23 (U.K.).
101. BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE, supra note 86, at 12.
102. Id. (Noting that "bona fide hospitality and promotional, or other business expenditure
which seeks to improve that image of a commercial organization, better to [sic] present products and
services, or establish cordial relations, is recognized as an established and important part of doing
business and it is not the intention of the Act to criminalize such behaviour. The Government does not
intend for the Act to prohibit reasonable and proportionate hospitality and promotional or other similar
[Vol. 18:1
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provides an explicit affirmative defense to companies that can demonstrate
that they had adequate procedures in place geared towards preventing
bribery.'0o
F. Penalties
Corporations and individuals face potential civil and criminal penalties
if they violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.'4 The DOJ
prosecutes criminal matters arising under the FCPA while the SEC
prosecutes civil matters arising under the same. 0 5  Individuals prosecuted
under the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions face a maximum of five years
imprisonment, criminal fines of up to $100,000, and civil penalties of up to
$10,000 per violation, as well as restitution and forfeiture.106  The
individual's employer or principal is prohibited from paying these fines.'o7
FCPA violators also face suspension or revocation of the benefits of
conducting business in the United States. 08  In criminal prosecutions,
corporations and other business entities face hefty fines of up to two million
dollars per violation.'09 Under the Alternative Fines Act, these fines may
be much higher."o Where the offense resulted in pecuniary gain or loss, the
business expenditure intended for these purposes. It is, however, clear that hospitality and promotional
or other similar business expenditure can be employed as bribes."); Michelle Shapiro, FCPA + UK
Bribery Act = Greater Global Exposure, COMPLINET.COM (Jan. 28, 2011) http://www.complinet.com/
dodd-frank/news/analysis/article/fcpa-uk-bribery-act-greater-global-exposure.html (last visited Aug. 5,
2011).
103. See generally Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 7(2) (U.K.).
104. DOJ GUIDE, supra note 21.
105. Id.; For a detailed discussion on current FCPA enforcement, see Jon Jordan, Recent
Developments in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New UK Bribery Act: A Global Trend
Towards Greater Accountability in the Prevention of Foreign Bribery, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 845, 853-
856.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g); DOJ GUIDE, supra note 21 (The SEC may bring civil actions for
fines of up to $10,000 against any firm as well as any officer, director, employee, or agent of a firm, or
stockholder acting on behalf of the firm, who violates the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. In addition,
the SEC has discretion to impose additional fines that do not exceed the greater of the gross amount of
the pecuniary gain to the defendant as a result of the violation. Individuals and companies that violate
the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions may have their import/export licenses revoked or denied).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(3); Jacqueline L. Bonneau, Combating Foreign Bribery:
Legislative Reform in the United Kingdom and Prospects for Increased Global Enforcement, 49
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 365, 382 (2011).
108. U. S. DEP'T OF STATE, FIGHTING GLOBAL CORRUPTION: BuSINESS RISK MANAGEMENT
28 (2d ed., 2011), available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/pdfs/FightingGlobalCorruption.pdf (last
visited Nov. 6, 2011) [hereinafter DOS CORRUPTION REPORT]; Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 46, at 431.
109. DOJ GUIDE, supra note 21; ZARIN, supra note 4, at 8-4.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 3571; DOJ GUIDE, supra note 21; DOS CORRUPTION REPORT, supra note 107,
at 28.
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actual fine may be up to twice the amount of the benefit the defendant
sought to obtain by making the corrupt payment."'
Penalties under the Bribery Act are much stricter than penalties under
the FCPA."2 Corporations running afoul of the Bribery Act face unlimited
fines as well as civil confiscation actions arising pursuant to the Proceeds of
Crime Act of 2002 to recover profits or gains recognized from the bribe."'
In addition, individuals face a maximum of ten years imprisonment and
unlimited fines, while company directors face potential disqualification
under the Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986.114 Unlike the
FCPA, which imposes both criminal and civil liabilities on individuals, the
Bribery Act imposes only criminal liability on individuals violating its
provisions."' Under the Bribery Act a company, or its directors, may also
be barred from participation in public sector contracts in the European
Union." 6
G. Compliance
The FCPA does not create a compliance defense to corporate liability,
but U.S. enforcement authorities have indicated that in making charging
and disposition decisions related to FCPA violations, they consider
whether, and to what extent, a company had a preexisting and effective
compliance program in place." 7 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines also
indicate that a court will consider an effective compliance program when
deciding whether to mitigate the penalties imposed on a company for FCPA
violations."' When companies encounter FCPA issues, they must be able
111. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d); DOJ GUIDE, supra note 21.
112. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g) with Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 11 (U.K.).
113. Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, c.29, § 6 (2002) (U.K.); Toby Duthie & David Lawler, The
United Kingdom Bribery Bill, 26 CONST. L.J. 146, 149 (2010).
114. See generally Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986, c.46 (1986) (U.K.); Timothy
Ashby, The New UK. Bribery Act: A Legal Mindfield for CEOs, CHIEF EXEC. (May 6, 2011),
http://chiefexecutive.net/the-new-uk-bribery-act-a-legal-minefield-for-ceos (last visited Aug. 5, 2011)
(noting that the Bribery Act holds senior executives and directors personally liable for failing to prevent
bribery being committed by employees, agents, or subsidiaries doing business on their behalf).
115. See Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 11 (U.K.).
116. Shapiro, supra note 101.
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, 1(4)(b) (2010);
Michael T. Gass et al., Corporate FCPA Compliance Programs: A Necessity In Today's Aggressive
Enforcement Environment, EAPDLAW.COM, Mar. 28, 2006, at 1-2, available at
http://www.eapdlaw.com/files/News/605faaa2-2fc3-49eb-ba81-
lb005ec9675c/Presentation/NewsAttachment/1394a9e9-8fbf-44e6-bfl7-
9ed992347ce5/Client%2OAdvisoryCorporate%20FCPA%20Compliance%20Programs.pdf (last visited
Aug. 5,2011).
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to demonstrate the practicality of their compliance programs."' Companies
conducting international business should establish a standalone FCPA
compliance policy.120  A company should not rely on a few paragraphs
addressing international bribery and corruption in its General Standards of
Business Conduct as this would be entirely insufficient to mitigate the
company's exposure to FCPA violations.121 The DOJ has indicated that,
ideally, a company's compliance program should be comprehensive and
should typically include the following:
1) A clearly articulated corporate policy against
violations of the FCPA and foreign anti-corruption laws
and the establishment of compliance standards and
procedures to be followed by all directors, officers,
employees, agents, and all business partners involved in
business transactions, representation, or business
development or retention in a foreign jurisdiction that are
reasonably capable of reducing the possibility that these
laws will be violated;
2) The appointment of a Chief Compliance Officer who
shall report to the CEO of the company and to the Audit
Committee of the Board of Directors and be responsible
for implementation and oversight of the company's
compliance policies and procedures;
3) The effective communication to all directors, officers,
employees, agents and business partners of the company's
compliance policies, standards, and procedures regarding
the FCPA, by requiring regular training concerning the
requirements of the FCPA and annual certification of
compliance with the FCPA;
4) An effective reporting system, including a "Hotline,"
for directors, officers, employees, agents, business
partners, and third parties to report suspected violations of
the compliance program or other suspected illegal conduct
under the FCPA;
5) An appropriate disciplinary procedure designed to
address violations or suspected violations of the FCPA,
119. Amy Hatcher, The Latest Surge in Anti-Corruption Enforcement: What Looms on the
Horizon for Global Businesses and Their Leadership, ETHISPHERE (May 25, 2010),
http://ethisphere.com/the-latest-surge-in-anti-corruption-enforcement-what-looms-on-the-horizon-for-
global-businesses-and-their-leadership/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2011).
120. Stephen Clayton, Top Ten Basics of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance for the
Small Legal Department, AsSOC. OF CORP. COUNSEL (June 1, 2011), http://www.acc.com/
legalresources/publications/topten/SLD-FCPA-Compliance.cfm (last visited Aug. 5, 2011).
121. Id.
2011] Hunter 105
106 ILSA Journal ofInternational & Comparative Law [Vol. 18:1
the foreign anti-corruption laws, or the company's
compliance code;
6) Extensive due diligence requirements pertaining to the
company's agents and business partners, including the
maintenance of complete due diligence records at the
company;
7) Clearly articulated corporate procedures designed to
ensure that substantial discretionary authority is not
delegated to individuals that the company knows, or
should know, through the exercise of due diligence, have
a propensity to engage in illegal or improper activities;
8) A system to review and to record, in writing, actions
relating to the retention of any agents or subagents and all
contracts or payments related thereto;
9) The inclusion in all agreements, contracts, and
contract renewals, with all agents and business partners of
provisions:
i) Setting forth anti-corruption representations and
undertakings;
ii) Relating to compliance with the FCPA and
foreign anti-corruption laws;
iii) Allowing for periodic internal and independent
audits of the books and records of the agent or business
partner to ensure compliance with the company's policies
and procedures; and
iv) Providing for termination of the agent or
business partner as a result of any breach of the FCPA or
foreign anti-corruption laws.' 22
Considering U.S. enforcement authorities' current aggressive FCPA
enforcement, a comprehensive FCPA compliance program will
undoubtedly be invaluable in protecting U.S. companies operating
overseas. 12 Unlike the FCPA, the U.K. Bribery Act offers a compliance
defense to corporate liability, where a company will not be subject to
prosecution if it had adequate procedures in place, which were designed to
prevent persons associated with the company from engaging in the type of
conduct that precipitated the prosecution.124 The term "adequate
procedures" was left undefined in the Act itself. However, the U.K.
Secretary of State, Kenneth Clarke, published guidance that outlines six
122. DOJ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, Opinion Procedure Release No. 04-02, at 2-3
(July 12, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpalopinion/2004/0402.pdf (last
visited Aug. 5, 2011).
123. See generally Cook & Connor, supra note 25.
124. See Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 7(2) (U.K.).
principles that commercial organizations should employ when
implementing their policies and procedures. 12 5 The principles mentioned
are as follows:
1) Proportionate procedures;
2) Top-level commitment;
3) Risk assessment;
4) Due diligence;
5) Communication (including training); and
6) Monitoring and review.'26
The U.K. authorities have indicated that the adequacy of a firm's
procedures will be evaluated based on these six principles.12 7 The Guidance
also suggests that these principles are not prescriptive, but rather are
intended to be flexible in order to apply to a wide variety of
circumstances. 128 The first principle suggests that a company's procedures
to counter bribery should be proportionate to the bribery risks it faces and
to the nature, scale, and complexity of the commercial organization's
activities.12 9 These procedures should also be clear, practical, accessible,
and effectively implemented and enforced.130 The guidance notes that a
company's level of risk will be linked to the size of the organization to
some extent, but that size will not be the exclusive determinant of such
risk.'3 1 The second principle asserts that companies must demonstrate a
top-level commitment to preventing bribery by persons associated with
them.132  This type of commitment can be reflected in effective formal
statements that demonstrate a commitment to engaging in honest and
transparent business, as well as a commitment to zero tolerance towards
bribery. 33 An articulation of the business benefits of rejecting bribery is
also an effective way to demonstrate a company's top-level commitment to
preventing bribery.134 The third principle suggests that companies should
conduct an informed assessment of the nature and extent of their exposure
125. BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE, supra note 86, at 20.
126. Id. at 20-31.
127. Id. at 20; Matt T. Morley, Robert V. Hadley, & Laura Atherton, U.K. Bribery Act: What
Non-UK Companies Need to Know (K & L Gates, Pittsburg, Pa.), Mar. 31, 2011, available at
http://www.klgates.com/uk-bribery-act-what-non-uk-companies-need-to-know-03-31-201 1/ (last visited
Nov. 6, 2011).
128. BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE, supra note 86, at 20.
129. Id. at 21.
130. Id. at 21.
131. Id. at 21.
132. Id. at 23.
133. BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE, supra note 86, at 23.
134. Id. at 23.
2011] Hunter 107
ILSA Journal ofInternational & Comparative Law
to potential external and internal risks of bribery on their behalf by persons
associated with them.'35  U.K. enforcement authorities encourage
companies to create procedures that will accurately identify and prioritize
their risks.' 36 A company's assessment should be reevaluated periodically
as the company's business evolves and such assessment should be
consistently documented.' 37 Particular attention should be paid to the types
of external risks that a company may encounter.'38 The country or sector in
which an organization operates may pose a distinct type of risk for that
organization.13 9  Similarly, certain types of transactions or business
opportunities and certain kinds of business relationships may also pose
unique risks to the organization.140  The fourth principle suggests that
companies should develop due diligence procedures that are proportionate
to the companies' risks.141 The Guidance notes that due diligence
procedures are a form of bribery risk assessment as well as a means of
mitigating risk.142 The Guidance also suggests that considerable care be
exercised when entering into certain business relationships that are
particularly difficult to modify or terminate.14 3 The fifth principle expresses
the need for bribery prevention policies to be embedded and understood
throughout an organization through internal and external communication
and training that demonstrates the organization's commitment to preventing
bribery by person's associated with it.'" Training should be proportionate
to the organization's risks and should raise awareness about the threats of
bribery and the ways in which such bribery may be addressed.'4 5 The sixth
principle suggests that companies should develop ways of monitoring and
evaluating the effectiveness of their bribery prevention procedures, and
these procedures should be modified where necessary.146  Companies
should consistently review their policies and procedures in light of
governmental changes in countries in which they operate, negative press
reports, or incidents of bribery experienced by the company.147
135. Id. at 25.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE, supra note 86, at 26.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 27.
142. Id.
143. BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE, supra note 86, at 27.
144. Id. at 29.
145. Id. at 30.
146. Id. at 31.
147. Id.
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III. IMPACT OF THE BRIBERY ACT
A. How Will the Bribery Act Impact Doing Business With the United
Kingdom?
Considerable fuss has been made about the Bribery Act and its
impending impact, primarily because compliance with the FCPA will not
necessarily equal Bribery Act compliance.14 8  The Bribery Act has been
characterized as the strictest anti-corruption legislation to date.149 However,
the Bribery Act's force will largely depend on the SFO's prosecutory
appetite. 5 o The SFO has encountered problems in the past with regards to
its ineffective criminal enforcement, and has been highly criticized for its
low conviction rates in comparison to the DOJ and SEC.' The SFO's
director, Richard Alderman, stated that the SFO is not interested in
pursuing "decent" companies conducting business under difficult
circumstances, but asserted that the SFO would assist organizations in
resolving issues with "minimum fuss." 5 2  The SFO has encouraged
companies to self-report when they have evidence of or suspect misconduct
by their employees. 5 3  The Bribery Act utilizes broad language and gives
the SFO tremendous discretion, but it remains to be seen whether the SFO
will take advantage of this discretion.154 Currently, the United States is the
global leader in enforcing anti-corruption legislation but this could change
very quickly if the SFO commits to adamantly enforcing the United
Kingdom's new law.155
Legal analysts have indicated their expectation that the SFO will
aggressively prosecute individuals and organizations that run afoul of the
148. Shapiro, supra note 101.
149. Id.; Weil Alert: UK. Bribery Act, supra note 43; Ashby, supra note 113.
150. Warin et al., supra note 18, at 36.
151. Id. at 4.
152. Jonathan Russell, The SF0 Needs A Big Scalp ifBribery Act is to be Feared, TELEGRAPH
(U.K.) (July 1, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/8609414/The-SFO-needs-a-big-
scalp-if-Bribery-Act-is-to-be-feared.html (noting that the SFO will be going after big companies, with
big pockets that are capable of engaging in big acts of bribery).
153. PETER WILKINSON, THE 2010 U.K. BRIBERY ACT: ADEQUATE PROCEDURES 79
(Transparency Int'l U.K., July 2010), available at http://www.transparency.org.uk/
publications/adequate-procedures/120-adequate-procedures/download (last visited Aug. 5, 2011).
154. The United Kingdom's Bribery Act 2010 and other Recent Anti-Corruption Enforcement
Activity in the United Kingdom, (Chadbourne & Parke, LLP New York, N.Y.), May 3, 2010, at 1,
available at http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/b428aea0-6774-459d-b38c-69c70124d271/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/be805ef7-f4a2-4c27-b517-77b2ab7205a4/UKBriberyAct.pdf (last
visited Aug. 5, 2011).
155. Michelle Duncan et al., A Comparison of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the
UK Bribery Act, PAULHASTINGS.COM, Oct. 2010, at 1, available at http://www.paulhastings.con/
assets/publications/1750.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2011).
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Bribery Act.'56 These analysts also surmise that companies that currently
have aggressive anti-bribery systems in place should be able to effectively
adapt to the Bribery Act.'57  In enforcing the Bribery Act, and before
commencing an investigation, the SFO will likely attempt to establish a
pattern of conduct that demonstrates an organization's failure to alter its
procedures to comply with the Bribery Act.'58 One attorney indicated that
the Bribery Act would not be a "game changer" for most companies that
have been subject to the FCPA, but companies that have been remiss in
anti-bribery compliance may have reasons to be concerned.'" It is essential
to note that the SFO intends to aggressively pursue foreign companies listed
in the United Kingdom despite the MOJ's assertion that a listing in itself
would not give rise to Bribery Act liability.6 o Although the SFO does not
conduct sector-wide investigations the organization has warned that it plans
to work closely with the foreign authorities that do conduct such
investigations, in particular the DOJ and the SEC.16' The SFO has also
expressed its intention to combat bribery by utilizing the United Kingdom's
money laundering laws.'62  Rigid implementation of the Bribery Act's
provisions will likely cause many companies to terminate various foreign
relationships in an effort to avoid prosecution.'63 A recent Dow Jones State
of Anti-Corruption Compliance Survey indicated that more than 55% of
companies delay or avoid working with global business partners because
they are fearful of noncompliance with anti-bribery regulations.'6
B. How Do Facilitation Payments Affect a Company's Ability to do
Business in a Foreign Country?
The Bribery Act's prohibition on facilitation payments could make it
impossible to do business in some countries if the officials of these foreign
156. Michael Connor, New U.K. Bribery Law Could Have International Impact, BUSINESS-
ETHics (Jan. 6, 2011), http://business-ethics.com/2011/01/06/1525-new-uk-bribery-law-could-have-
international-impact/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2011).
157. Id.
158. Our Top 5 Predictions For the Ist Year of the Bribery Act, BRIBERYACT.COM (July 1,
2011), http://thebriberyact.com/2011/07/01/our-top-5-predictions-for-the-Ist-year-of-the-bribery-act/
(last visited Aug. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Our Top 5 Predictions].
159. Connor, supra note 155.
160. Our Top S Predictions, supra note 157.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Dow Jones Risk & Compliance, Dow Jones State ofAnti-Corruption Compliance Survey,
Dow JONES (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.dowjones.com/pressroom/SMPRs/DJACCSurvey2011.html
(last visited Aug. 5, 2011).
164. Id.
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countries refuse to provide services absent the payment of bribes."' This
prohibition has created much concern for organizations in light of the
SFO's statement that it intends to rigorously enforce that particular
provision.166  However, the SFO has expressed that it is unlikely to
prosecute persons or entities that make small payments to compel routine,
non-discretionary government action, unless these payments are part of a
larger pattern, or are systemic of a wider lack of adequate procedures.161
The SFO's ultimate plan is to completely phase out facilitation payments,
but it recognizes that the process may take a few years.'68  In light of such
leniency towards small facilitation payments, the U.K. authorities will
expect companies to consult with them if issues arise, as this would
demonstrate to the authorities that these companies are working towards
zero tolerance in the near future.169 The conflict between the FCPA, which
excludes facilitation payments from the scope of its prohibitions, and the
Bribery Act would likely force organizations to follow the higher U.K.
standard and incur higher costs in order to remain compliant with the Act
while doing business with the United Kingdom. 70
C. What Industries Will Be Most Affected By the Bribery Act?
Research conducted by Ernst & Young based on the analysis of FCPA
bribery convictions illustrates ten sectors that are most vulnerable to the
Bribery Act. '1 These sectors, listed in order of vulnerability, are as
follows:
165. Bonneau, supra note 106, at 401; WILKINSON, supra note 152, at 29 (explaining that the
prohibition on facilitation payments results in adverse consequences because in some markets it is
impossible to travel or get business done without these types of payments. In addition, the article states
that apart from the legal risks of facilitation payments, a practice of making such payments can make a
company more vulnerable to bribery as it sends a message to employees and business partners of
inconsistency in no-bribery policies as well as creates a dependency among public officials to rely on
these facilitation payments).
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1) Oil and Gas;
2) Life Sciences;
3) Consumer Products;
4) Technology;
5) Real Estate;
6) Automotive;
7) Telecoms;
8) Asset Management;
9) Banking and Capital Markets;
10) Government and Mining Metals.
Ernst & Young's Fraud Investigations and Dispute Services' (FIDS)
director, David Lister, stated:
[Although the oil and gas sector] is the most "at risk"
sector in terms of the number of prosecutions that are
likely to be incurred, there is no suggestion that
individuals and companies within the oil and gas sector
are intrinsically more corrupt than their counterparts in
other sectors. Rather, it is the nature and locations of their
businesses that exposes them to additional risk.172
Lister also added that the FCPA data is a good indicator of potential
Bribery Act prosecutions because the DOJ and the SFO commonly share
information.173 The pharmaceutical industry is another industry that will
likely fall under the Bribery Act's radar.174 U.K. enforcement authorities
have mentioned this industry as a potential target under the new law,
indicating the DOJ's recent probe into this industry as the likely reason.175
IV. CONCLUSION
Bribery is no longer an acceptable form of doing business. Such a
notion is a thing of the past, yet bribery remains a threat to both developed
and developing countries. The FCPA and the Bribery Act are designed to
abate the threats that stunt economic development in many countries. For
many years, the United States led the crusade on eradicating bribery and
corruption from the global economy through rigid FCPA enforcement. The
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173. Id.
174. Patrick Gilfillan, The Bribery Act and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is Big Pharma in Big
Trouble?, BRIBERYLIBRARY.COM (July 8, 2011), http://www.briberylibrary.com/gifts-hospitality/the-
bribery-act-and-the-pharamaceutical-industry-is-big-pharma-in-big-trouble/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
175. Dionne Searcey, UK. Law on Bribes Has Firms in a Sweat, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2010,
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United Kingdom, on the other hand, came under constant scrutiny for its
relaxed enforcement attitude towards bribery. The United Kingdom
eventually responded to this scrutiny; the response was deafening.
Organizations worldwide can be assured that the United Kingdom will use
its new Bribery Act powers to improve its long-standing reputation as an
ineffective enforcer. Organizations should familiarize themselves with
every provision of the Act and adjust their practices accordingly. U.K.
authorities will have tremendous discretion to prosecute bribery, and
organizations should be prepared for their scrutiny.
